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Abstract 
The impact of structural adjustment programs in Sub--Saharan Africa have now 
generated a decade long history. The impact of deregulation and privatization on the 
restructuring of banks and their performance is little studied, along with its implications for 
servicing constituencies rationed out of the liberalized banks portfolios. This paper reviews 
this experience of bank restructuring and the implications for the post-liberalization supply 
of financial services in The Gambia and Mozambique. Lessons for other African countries 
are highlighted for review. 
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L lntroduetion 
Structural adjustment programs have now had close to a ten year history in many 
African countries. Nevertheless, the impact of deregulation and privatization efforts on the 
financial sector have been less fully documented and analyzed. This paper attempts to make 
up for this deficiency in two countries that represent opposite poles in the continuum of 
development in the continent: The Gambia and Mozambique. Both countries record similar 
levels of low income per capita (between $100 and $300) which are low even by African 
standards. Both economies have received substantial donor support covering their 
government budget and balance of payments deficits. But in other respects they reflect 
sharp differences: in size (1 million vs. 16 million inhabitants) and, more importantly, in 
economic orientation with an outward oriented private sector predominance in The Gambia 
vs. an inward oriented socialist economy up to the late 1980s for Mozambique. 
These countries trace out different paths of financial liberalization that are instructive 
lessons for Africa. In The Gambia, a supply leading financial development strategy 
predominated until the launching of the Economic Recovery Program in late 1985. In 
Mozambique, a heavy handed centrally planned allocation of financial resources dominated 
the socialist FREUMO government until roughly the same time. The interesting story 
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emerges from the mid 1980s to the present as both countries became subject to structural 
adjustment programs of the IMF and the World Bank and evolved through different 
institutional paths of deregulation and privatization. The contrast that emerges is that The 
Gambia has evolved through a private market solution for financial liberalization by the 
early 1990s while Mozambique has been compelled to work through a public sector path of 
reform in restructuring its supply of financial services. Both solutions bring problems in 
their wake and it is those problems and partial solutions that will concern us throughout the 
paper. Furthermore, the lessons from the Mozambique experience are considered relevant 
for a number of other African countries such as Angola and Ethiopia that have yet to follow 
the path of transition from socialist to market economies. 
The first section of the paper documents the state of formal financial markets in the 
mid-1980s, and the paths of deregulation followed by each country. The implications of this 
liberalization effort are highlighted particularly with respect to constituencies screened out 
of formal sector portfolios following these bank restructuring efforts. The second section 
then reviews the state of informal finance recently documented in both countries and the 
role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in filling the vacuum left by the deregulated 
decline of formal financial services. Of particular interest here are the options for client-
owned financial intermediaries in each country and the degree to which an NGO 
institutional design can overcome both the asymmetric information problems that limit the 
reach of formal finance and the agency problems that limit the life of NGO efforts to supply 
financial services to a low income clientele. The final section draws out the principal 
lessons learned from these different paths of financial deregulation. 
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11. 1be Gambia: From Supply Leading Finance to Complete Privatization. 
The principal macroeconomic parameters for The Gambia are presented in Table 
1. It can be seen that the economy deteriorated substantially from the early to the mid 
1980s. Rising rates of inflation, growing budget deficits, and a low growth profile emerged 
by the mid 1980s. This state of affairs led the government to initiate the Economic 
Recovery Program that was later reinforced by structural adjustment loans from the IMF 
and the World Bank (McPherson and Radelet). Increasingly rigorous stabilization policies 
substantially reduced the rate of inflation from 1988 to the present. The liberalization thrust 
in these programs decisively reshaped the financial sector consisting of a large public sector 
development bank and the branches of three international banks. Credit ceilings on the 
volume of credit were phased out as more traditional methods were established to control 
the money supply. Interest rate ceilings were also removed and subsidized interest rates 
were eliminated with positive real rates of interest emerging from 1988 onwards. In short, 
all of the ingredients of the selective credit policies so characteristic of the former supply 
leading financial development strategy were terminated. Finally, a complete privatization 
of the supply of financial services emerged in July 1992 as the once dominant public sector 
Gambia Commercial and Development Bank (GCDB) sold its deposit base and a small part 
of its asset portfolio to an international bank (i.e., Meridien Bank). Instead of privatizing 
the GCDB itself, a small portion of its performing assets (balanced out with treasury bills) 
and all its liabilities were transferred to a private international bank that agreed to enter 
the banking sector under these conditions. In effect, this buyout represented an implicit 
deposit insurance bail out vehicle for the government as it found an international bank to 
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assume the deposit liabilities of a failing public sector bank that the government otherwise 
would have had to assume. Therefore, by late 1992, the banking sector consisted of the 
branches of four private international banks. The earlier experiment of creating a semi-
specialized development bank came to an end as deregulation successfully privatized the 
entire supply of financial services for the country. 
Table 1. llldlces of Real ud Sectoral GDP aod SeJedecl Fbumdal Sedor IDdkaton Ia Tlae Gambia 
1981·1991 (1981=100). 
Real Ec.onomic Growth Indices F'mancial Sector Variables 
Year Agriculture Industry Services Total GDP GOP Real Loan MJGDP 
GOP GDP GDP GOP Growth Deflator Rate: Ag. 
Rate(%) % Loans 
-(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1981 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 7.30 na 0.21 
1982 142.38 79.40 99.53 108.93 8.9 3.37 na 0.21 
1983 171.93 69.85 111.55 122.73 12.6 1.60 na 0.25 
1984 135.56 83.65 113.97 117.12 -4.5 17.19 -0.38 0.22 
1985 145.00 81.10 116.65 120.78 3.1 8.64 -5.17 0.27 
1986 129.20 112.10 149.84 126.87 5.8 42.89 -10.05 0.20 
1987 138.18 129.04 148.26 130.40 2.8 29.85 -16.18 0.21 
1988 136.79 120.57 155.01 132.63 1.7 6.41 6.42 0.24 
1989 133.20 125.49 165.51 138.01 4.1 13.18 9.15 0.22 
1990 144.84 135.05 172.25 145.73 5.6 14.55 9.82 0.21 
1991 124.62 138.70 186.25 148.80 21 9.90 18.82 0.21 
Source: Central Bank of The Gambia. Various Bulletins. Reported in Douglas H. Graham, ct al., flpanciaJ 
Markets in The Gambia. A Report to the USAID Mission, Banjul, The Ohio State University, Rural 
Fmance Program, January 1993, Chapter Oue. 
One can see the evolution of this path of liberalization along with some interesting 
consequences in the following tables of this section. Table 2 highlights the substantial 
decline in total bank credit that accompanied this process of stabilization, liberalization and 
privatization. Overall real credit declined by sixty percent from 1983 to 1991 (column 5). 
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Moreover, it is also clear that agricultural credit suffered the most severe decline of all 
sectors over this period (column 1 ). The ratio of agricultural credit to agricultural GOP 
declined from a range of 30 to 40 percent in the early to mid 1980s to 7 to 8 percent in the 
early 1990s. While the credit to GOP ratio declined for all sectors, it clearly declined 
relatively more in the agricultural sector. It is also of interest to note that during this 
overall decline in credit activity, the financial deepening indicator or MJGDP in Table 1 
(column 8) held steady (around 21 percent of GOP) during this period. In short, there was 
no decline in the deposit or savings base of the banking system; only in its credit activity. 
Table .2. Indices of Real Commerdal Bank Credit by Sector Ia The Gambia (1981=100). 
Year 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Agriculture 
(1) 
100.00 
106.54 
110.55 
84.57 
81.86 
66.27 
39.71 
44.05 
32.14 
19.83 
2D.43 
Source: Same as Table 1. 
Construction 
(2) 
100.00 
93.95 
72.18 
95.42 
lZ1.58 
133.50 
80.88 
69.89 
63.48 
43.53 
31.40 
Services Other 
(3) (4) 
100.00 100.00 
99.49 79.35 
97.53 101.25 
lZ7.47 52.36 
100.69 70.98 
77.70 47.98 
51.46 40.99 
58.93 33.42 
56.31 49.26 
53.21 46.53 
58.67 43.42 
Total 
(5) 
100.00 
95.42 
101.28 
88.96 
87.38 
68.65 
48.33 
47.13 
46.77 
39.69 
39.88 
This relative stability of the deposit base during the decline in credit balances is 
consistent with the declining loan/deposit ratios recorded in Table 3. The loan/deposit 
ratio for private banks declined from 45 percent in the mid 1980s to 31-33 percent by the 
early 1990s (column 3). The declining ratio for the GCDB (column 2) began from a level 
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greater than one since it includes substantial borrowings for targeted credit schemes from 
the Central Bank (which are absent in private commercial banks). The relevant results, of 
course, is the low ratio recorded for private banks in column 3 since with the demise of the 
GCDB the banking sector since July 1m consists only of private banks. 
Table3. Ratios or Loans to Total Deposits or Commerdal Baab Ill 1be Gambia 1986-1991. 
Year 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Source: Same as Table 1. 
All Banks GCDB Private Banks 
ro ~ ~ 
1.43 2.50 0.45 
0.88 1.54 0.35 
0.81 1.51 0.25 
0.80 1.46 0.31 
0.71 1.32 0.31 
0.67 1.35 0.33 
The low loan/ deposit ratio for private banks raises questions about the asset structure 
of the banking system. On the one hand, a sharp decline in loan activity has been recorded 
particularly from 1983 onwards. On the other hand, the deposit base has grown along with 
the growth of the economy as seen in the relatively constant MJGDP indicator. Clearly 
some asset other than loans has risen in relative importance in the asset portfolio of the 
banking industry from 1986 to the present. To set forth the evidence on the change in the 
composition of assets, panel A of Table 4 restricts its documentation to that of the three 
private banks that dominated the banking industry in the early 1990s following the rapid 
decline of the GCDB from the mid 1980s. The evidence in Table 4 is clear. Short term 
treasury bills (i.e., government securities) rose rapidly in the portfolios of the three 
commercial banks in the country. Whereas in 1986 they comprised only 26 percent of total 
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assets in these banks, by 1990 they had increased to 50 percent of the asset portfolios of the 
private sector banks. This is far higher than the ratios typically recorded for government 
and corporate securities held by banks in developed countries (i.e., 25-30 percent). 
Furthermore, since total assets here are inflated by items that are not ordinarily included 
in the balance sheets of banks in more developed countries (off-balance sheet activities) the 
relative weight for T-bills in The Gambia would be markedly higher using the more 
restricted balance sheet base common to the banking industty in developed countries. 
Probably the most revealing data in Table 4 are the relative weights of loans and 
advances, on the one hand, and government securities, i.e., T-bills, on the other hand. In 
1986, they both represented approximately one quarter of the outstanding portfolio of assets 
(while other assets predominated). From 1988 onwards the relative weight ofT-bills in total 
assets roughly grew to twice that of loans. The growths in the purchase of T-bills by 
commercial banks is evident in panel B of Table 4. From 1987 onwards the interest rates 
on T-bills rose rapidly. By the late 1980s they reached 17 to 18 percent and by 1991-92 
approximately 20 percent rates emerged (when inflation ranged between 6 to 14 percent). 
In short, by the late 1980s T-bills became a substantially more attractive asset with a good 
rate of return due to policy changes introducing bi-weekly bid-auctions. In the final analysis, 
this risk free return clearly outweighed returns in the loan market, especially when risk is 
considered. 
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Table 4. Relad"Ye Shares of Assets ud Liabilities for Private Commercial Banks ud Dlstribudon of 
Outstanding Govenuoent Securities In the Gambia, 1985-6 to 1991. 
A. Relative Shares of Assets and Liabilities (Private Commercial Banks) 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
(percent) 
ASSETS 
Cash 3.11 3.44 3.44 2.29 2.12 4.53 
Govt Sec. 25.18 31.44 45.85 45.54 50.35 42.81 
LoaDs & Advances 26.34 24.85 18.62 21.27 23.87 26.60 
Other Assets 45.38 40.27 32.09 30.90 23.66 26.06 
Total Assets 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
UABILITIES 
Borrowings 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Demand Deposits 29.59 33.71 36.42 35.18 35.59 37.86 
Sav. and Tune Dep. 28.05 34.38 36.45 37.50 40.56 39.(17 
Other Liabilities. 33.68 22.12 15.84 15.24 11.29 12.62 
Capital 8.68 9.73 11.30 12.08 12.55 10.44 
Total Liabilities 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
B. Distribution of Outstanding Government Securities in The Gambia, (millions of current dalasis). 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
-T-bills 
Central Bank 0 0 30.00 9.66 0.28 13.88 19.09 
Commercial Banks 24.40 22.60 34.50 93.63 102.81 144.00 121.46 
Public Enterprises 0 0 6.00 24.11 45.99 62.29 114.30 
Nonbank Public 0 0 1.45 2.61 3.27 6.44 8.78 
Total 24.40 22.60 71.95 130.01 152.35 226.61 263.63 
Govt. Development Stock 
Central Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.00 
Commercial Banks 5.40 10.90 10.90 10.50 13.66 10.50 10.50 
Public Enterprise 7.40 11.80 11.80 11.80 0 0 1.30 
Nonbank Public 0.59 0.82 0.82 0.81 9.88 12.98 4.68 
Total 13.39 23.52 23.52 23.11 23.54 23.48 23.48 
Source: Same as Table 1. 
Table 5 underscores this risk feature by comparing the rates of return to loan and 
non loan activity for private commercial banks in the banking industry of The Gambia from 
1988 through 1990. First, the risks of lending are apparent both through the negative 
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returns recorded in 1988 and in the greater variance in returns compared to non-loan 
activity (primarily returns from T-bills and foreign exchange transactions). The returns on 
non-loan activity are substantially higher and more stable through time. Finally, it is of note 
to point out that these returns are unusually high by international standards. Rates of 
return on assets of one to two percent are considered high in the banking industry in 
developed economies. Thus the results in The Gambia are indeed unusually high. This 
grows out of the wide gross intermediation margins registered by banks in the country. By 
the early 1990s these reached 15 to 16 points between the weighted average of nominal 
deposit rates (including demand deposits) and asset rates (loans and securities combined). 
These margins are three to four times higher than those characteristic of banks in more 
developed financial markets and clearly reflect the higher risks of lending and the lack of 
competition in the banking industry in The Gambia. 
Table 5. Rate of Return on Loau and Non-Loan Assetl ID tbe Banldna System of The Gambia, 1988-
1990. 
A. All Commercial Banks 1988 1989 1990 
(1) (2) (3) 
1. Return on Loan Assets1 ·1.39 4.34 6.15 
2. Return on Non-Loan Assets1 8.96 8.33 10.43 
3. Return on Total Assets 4.81 6.49 8.55 
B. GCDB 1988 1989 1990 
1. Return on Loan Assets ..().60 1.49 5.39 
2. Return on Non-Loan Assets 2.16 0.90 4.10 
3. Return 011 Total Assets 0.60 1Z1 4.81 
C. Other Commercial Banks 1988 1989 1990 
1. Return on Loan Assets -3.89 10.25 7.89 
2. Return 011 Non-Loan Assets 14.42 14.22 15.18 
3. Return on Total Assets 11.18 13.29 13.32 
Source: Same as Table 1. 
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Thus by 1992 the evolution towards a liberalized and privatized financial sector was 
complete following seven years of a series of successful structural adjustment efforts. The 
real levels of outstanding loan balances declined over this period. At the same time, there 
was a rapid shift from predominantly public to private sector banking, from longer to shorter 
term loan contracts, from negative to positive real rates of interest, and from agricultural 
to non-agricultural lending, underscoring an urban bias in the newly deregulated financial 
market Agricultural loans fell from 30 to 35 percent of total lending in the early 1980s to 
16 percent of a much lower level of real lending in the early 1990s. Loans for trading 
enterprises increased from around 30 to over 45 percent of total lending over this same 
period. Industrial loans remained at about 5 to 7 percent over this period while loans to 
secure personal businesses and personal loans to civil servants held steady as a share of total 
lending from 30 to 32 percent for this period. 
These changes might lead some to argue that structural adjustment measures were 
detrimental to financial development, but this is misleading. Howver, the size of the loan 
market was highly exaggerated in the early eighties as was the heavy emphasis on 
agricultural loans (primarily through the GCDB). Much of the volume of outstanding 
balances at that time was made up of non-performing loans that contributed to the later 
downfall of the GCDB. The substantially reduced financial market of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s more accurately reflects the size of a more solvent and sustainable loan market, 
once the cleaned up balances of the GCDB are removed from the consolidated balance 
sheet for the banking sector. 
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At the same time, private banks reduced the general risk of their lending by 
screening out more risky borrowers and allocating a higher share of their assets to T-bills. 
This visible risk reduction incorporates an element of crowding out through the rapid expan-
sion of the T -bill market from 1988 onwards and the relative growth of this asset in private 
bank portfolios. The challenge facing Gambian authorities now is to expand and broaden 
financial intermediation beyond the mere transfer of the publics deposits into securities to 
cover the government's budget deficits. More attention must be given to the encouragement 
of institutional innovations to increase the supply of financial services to the admittedly 
riskier rural clientele that have been largely rationed out of bank portfolios through this 
path of deregulation and privatization. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a poss-
ible option here. NGOs have rapidly grown to fill the vacuum created by the disappearance 
of formal financial linkages to rural Gambian markets. The degree to which NGOs can 
satisfactorily fill this vacuum and supply viable, self sustaining financial services to their low 
income constituencies is an open question that will be explored later in this article. 
III. Formal Fmancial Reform in Mozambique: From Extreme Supply Leading Allocation 
to Private Sector Lending 
A. Introduction 
Table 6 sets forth key macroeconomic indicators for the Mozambican economy. 
From the late 1970s following its independence from Portugal until the late 1980s, the 
Mozambican economy experienced stagnation and decline. The FREUMO regime's 
centrally planned socialist experiment was finally abandoned in the mid-1980s with 
international multilateral donor support from 1987 onwards. The period from 1986-7 to the 
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present represents a period of painful readjustment as the Mozambican economy attempted 
to introduce market reforms. This process of deregulation has been slow and frustrating, 
particularly in light of the marked instability and bloodshed of a bitter guerilla war that 
slowed down the emergence of normal business practices and secure contracts until recently. 
Meaningful positive rates of growth only began to appear by 1987 (column 1) and the 
difficult stabilization program to control strong inflationary pressures has succeeded only in 
bringing inflation down to the 40 percent level by the early 1990s (column 2). Financial 
deregulation has gradually allowed previously controlled nominal interest rates to rise; 
however, they have yet to eliminate negative real rates of interest (column 3). The financial 
deepening indicator (in column 4) is misleading in that the relatively high ratios in the early 
to mid-1980s only represent currency in circulation and current demand deposits. Quasi-
money was largely non-existent in the Mozambican economy until the early 1990s when the 
widely fluctuating and relatively high inflation rates came under modest control. 
Table 6. Seled Macroeconomic Indicaton for Mozambique, 1981-91. 
GDP Rate of Consumer Price Real Rate of MJGDP 
Growth Index (% chg) Lending 6-12 
mo. Agr. Loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1981 0.5 3.8 Da 56.6 
1982 -3.5 17.9 na 64.2 
1983 -12.5 11.8 Da 78.9 
1984 1.1 14.8 na 77.6 
1985 -8.2 47.7 na 65.8 
1986 0.9 12.3 -SS.56 66.7 
1987 4.4 175.7 -22.05 38.S 
1988 s.s ss.o -17.14 38.6 
1989 3.2 40.0 -16.43 36.4 
1990 44.0 -18.06 
1991 42.0 -S.28 
SOurce: Bank of Mozambique. 
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The path of deregulation in Mozambique begins from a much more stagnant 
economic base than that in The Gambia. More importantly, hberalization efforts have been 
launched from a more extreme state of supply leading allocation strategies (i.e. a centrally 
planned regime) and from a much less promising institutional base. Private property rights 
and normal commercial practices have been seriously constrained by the chaotic juridical 
state of the FREUMO regime as it struggles to introduce private market reforms in a 
reluctantly receding socialist political environment. Finally, these constraints have been 
exacerbated by a bitter guerilla war that has periodically wreaked havoc throughout the 
country, even reaching the outskirts of the capital city of Maputo. The lack of security in 
this war torn society clearly created barriers to the free geographic movement of goods, 
finance, and people. Only in the last year or two has this destabi1izing lack of security 
gradually wound down to an apparently workable truce between the contending parties. 
B. The Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD): The Struggle for Financial 
Survival in a Transitional Regime. 
The path of financial liberalization in Mozambique occurred within a very different 
institutional setting from that of The Gambia. Gambian financial markets operated within 
essentially a private sector market economy with a strong element of supply leading finance 
through its principal public sector development bank. Mozambican financial institutions, 
in contrast, were operating within a centrally planned socialist framework. Therefore, the 
liberalization of financial markets in Mozambique takes on the features of a transitional 
economy moving from a communist to a market society. In The Gambia, one merely had 
to privatize a large bank, while in Mozambique, one is trying to privatize the economy. 
Among other things, this means the Gambian solution of bank privatization is much more 
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problematic, at least in the short to medium term, given the absence of any significant 
private sector banking activity in Mozambique. Nevertheless, it is important to identify the 
major issues of this reform process since it can characterize the likely future scenario for a 
number of -aansitionat• socialist regimes in Africa such as Angola and Ethiopia among 
others. 
Two public sector banks comprise the banking industty in Mozambique. One is the 
Bank of Mozambique which until recently functioned as the Central Bank as well as the 
largest commercial bank in the countty. Its clientele has consisted of all the large export 
companies run by the state along with many other parastatal operations for most of this 
period. The bank also dominated all the foreign exchange transactions until recently. By 
early 1992 efforts were launched to separate the commercial banking functions from the 
central banking activities with each eventually expected to constitute a separate institutional 
entity after a two year period. 
The Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD) is the other major bank in the 
countty. Though smaller than the Bank of Mozambique, it nevertheless has an extensive 
branch network throughout the country consisting of 10 large branches and 148 offices and 
limited service deposit collection posts. This gave it an advantage to service an agricultural 
clientele. At the same time, it was expected to promote development, as its title implies, 
and thus had a large component of long term loans in its portfolio in the mid 1980s. The 
focus of this section will be on the BPD. Its attempts to. adjust to the structural adjustment 
mandates of the IMF and the World Bank from the late 1980s onwards more aceurately 
trace out the travails of hl>eralization in a development bank scenario in Africa in a more 
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focused manner than would the experience of the Bank of Mozambique in which the 
devolution of central banking functions necessarily complicate the institutional issues of 
interest here. 
Table 7 sets forth the evolution of the BPD portfolio from 1985 to 1991 for some 
data and 1988-91 for other indicators. The most revealing change is the rapid shift from a 
public sector clientele to private sector borrowers as the mandate to reduce its losses was 
incorporated into bank policy. Whereas in 1985 roughly 95 percent of the portfolio 
consisted of parastatal firms, collective farms and other state entities, by 1991 this relative 
weight had declined to 11 percent. Thus, the various measures to inculcate a more market 
oriented set of economic policies and economic organization from the mid 1980s to the early 
1990s spurred the BPD to privatize its clientele. Since the privatization of state enterprises 
has been a long drawn out process, the private sector clientele consists largely of first time 
borrowers from the pool of recent small and medium scale entrepreneurs moving into 
business ventures for the first time. At the same time, it moved out of the riskier 
agricultural clientele and into the allegedly more remunerative private commerce and 
service trades. The data on term structure is misleading from 1985 to 1988 since the heavy 
incidence of short term loans for these years documented in Table 7 were in effect 
constantly renewed loans to state enterprises (at the governments command). Only from 
1989 onwards with greater administrative autonomy and the freedom to no longer loan to 
bankrupt state firms do the data on term structure accurately reflect the true rise in short 
term loans to its increasingly private sector clientele. Finally, it should be noted that these 
portfolio shifts were associated with a smaller level of real lending compared to· mid-1980s. 
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Table 7. Pereeat ot Total Approved Credit Allocation Ia tbe Baaco Popular de Deseavolvimellto 
(BPD) by Term StrudW'e, Sector, and LepJ Jurisdidloa (1985-1991) 
SBLECI'ED CATEGORY 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1. TERM STRUCI'. 
ShorHcrm 94.77 93.06 72.45 7U'/ 39.59 53.18 84.63 
Long-term 5.23 6.94 Z7.S5 28.73 60.41 46.82 15.37 
2. LEGAL 1URIS. 
State 94.56 91.59 81.60 66.60 26.24 20.96 10.82 
Cooperative 3.35 3.21 3.91 1.21 0.63 1.03 1.64 
Private Bus. 2.09 5.19 14.48 32.19 57.65 78.02 87.53 
3. CCADR (war veterans 15.48 
loan fund) 
4. SECI'OR 
Agriculture 5637 33.78 44.90 26.34 
Industry 41.20 40.90 31.90 17.01 
Commerce and Serv. 0.59 5.57 15.45 46.80 
Construction 0.30 0.07 0.00 2.89 
Transports 1.54 4.19 7.74 6.96 
CCADR 15.48 
Source: Derived from BPD files and reported in "The Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento and Formal 
Informal Fmancial Market Linkages in Maputo, Mozambique," Report to the USAID Mission. 
Maputo. March 1993. 
This evolving profile of the BPDs portfolio reflects reasonable banking behavior in 
light of the gradual liberalization of financial market controls over this period. Ceilings on 
the volume of credit were relaxed by the early 1990s. Selective credit policies with interest 
rate ceilings were generally relaxed until the multiple tiers of administered interest rates 
were collapsed into a smaller number of categories over this period. Throughout this 
period, the bank was reallocating its lending from lower interest rate agricultural loans into 
higher interest rate commercial and service sector loans to earn a higher rate of return. 
Finally, in April1992 all mandated interest rate differentials were eliminated across sectors. 
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In essence, from 1989 onwards the bank was largely free to reallocate its portfolio to 
maximize its risk adjusted return within a greatly liberalized financial market. 
Performance indicators in Table 8 present an interesting contrast to one of the 
indicators highlighted in the data on The Gambia. It is clear that the BPD has a much 
higher loan-deposit ratio and loan to asset ratio than those recorded in the liberalized 
banking system of The Gambia. By 1992, the BPD had generated a high 63 percent loan 
to asset ratio (compared to 25 percent in The Gambia) and commensurately a high 71 
percent loan deposit ratio (compared to 33 percent in the Gambian private banking system 
at the same time). In short, the BPD is much more of a lending institution than are the 
banks in The Gambia. 
In line with this behavior it is relevant to note the visible trade-off between liquidity 
and loans as a share of assets in the BPD. From 1988 through 1990 the BPD recorded high 
liquidity ratios and relatively low loan to asset ratios. Whereas in 1991 and 1992 the 
liquidity ratio dropped to 13 and 8 percent (from a 40 percent level in 1990) the loan to 
asset ratio increased from 51 percent in 1990 to 60 and 63 percent in 1991 and 1992 
respectively. liquid assets in the BPD earn no interest. The bank, once freed from the 
Central Bank credit ceilings levied on the volume of credit prior to 1991, quickly moved into 
more interest earning loan activity. However, the lack of a remunerative short term 
securities market, such as exists in The Gambia, prevents the BPD from diversifying its 
portfolio. Thus it is presented with a Hobson's choice, namely, maintain high liquid reserves 
that earn no interest and lose their real value through inflation, or, increase loans beyond 
an acceptable risk threshold in the loan market. 
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Table 1 GeDeral FIDaDdal Rados ud Perf'01'111811Ce IDdlcaton ror tbe BPD frolll1988 to tm. 
Indicators 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
l GENERAL FINANCIAL INDICATORS 
L Loan-Deposit Ratio 0.53 0.51 0.59 0.67 0.71 
2. Loan-Asset Ratio 0.46 0.44 0.51 0.60 0.63 
3. Deposit-Uability Ratio 0.87 0.88 0.87 0.89 0.89 
4. liquidity Ratio 0.41 0.46 0.39 0.13 0.()8 
S. Debt-Equity Ratio 45.()8 33m 4L98 43.78 39.86 
U.SELECI'ED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
1. Gross Return on Assets 0.()3 0.()3 0.()4 o.os 0.06 
a. Gross Return on Loans o.os om 0.07 om 0.07 
b. Gross Return on Non-Loans o.oo 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.04 
2. Net Return on Assets 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
3. Delinquency Ratio 0.45 031 0.27 0.22 0.24 
Source: Same as Table 6. 
This pressure to move more aggressively into the loan market has taken its toll on 
the BPD. Its net return on assets in Table 8 has been zero or negative for the past five 
years. This grows out of the need to write off the backlog of non-performing loans on its 
portfolio in recent years. Since most of the defaulted loans documented in the high ratios 
of ll-3 of Table 8 are comprised of the state enterprise clientele from the former era, one 
might think that the mere transformation from a state to a private sector clientele represents 
a solution to the bank's problems. Unfortunately, a random survey of the loan repayment 
status of 136 recently selected private sector clients in the Maputo branch of the BPD 
indicates that close to SO percent of this clientele are in a state of arrears (Graham and 
Silva Francisco, pp. 42-3). 
The bank has been able to survive this unsatisfactoty state of affairs until now 
because of periodic capital injections by the government (to cover the losses incurred from 
failed state enterprises) and the fact that 96 percent of all deposit liabilities consist of non-
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interest bearing current accounts. Given the lack of any effective competition from the 
other bank (i.e., the Bank of Mozambique also has only a negligtble share of interest earn-
ing time deposits among its liabilities), depositors have few options. The real losers in this 
situation are the net savers in the public at large who have no way to earn even a nominal, 
much less a real rate of interest on their deposits. Savers will never be able to be properly 
serviced with remunerative interest earning accounts until the bank learns to manage risk 
and screen borrowers effectively for its loan portfolio. Currently, the BPD is able to operate 
in part because of the relatively costless excess liquidity at its disposal from the liability side 
of its balance sheet. Finally, the high debt equity ratio (roughly 40 to one) suggests that de-
positors are at risk from a grossly undercapitalized bank. The government of Mozambique 
is finding it difficult to muster any additional funds currently to recapitalize the bank to a 
level that would reduce in any substantial way the risk currently faced by depositors. 
The rapid growth of private sector clients from 1988 to the present reflects an entre-
preneurial response to the gradual relaxation of price and marketing controls by the govern-
ment. Moreover, the BPD has clearly played a nurturing role in making debt finance 
available to these embryonic entrepreneurs. Nevertheless, many untested new businessmen 
and women are launching these ventures in an unstable market setting where commercial 
contracts and business practices are rudimentary, supplier and client marketing networks are 
poorly developed, and all parties are subject to unforeseen policy risks introduced by the 
government. 
In short the BPD, as an important financier of these recent initiatives, has been 
unable to avoid a high risk private sector clientele with a high likelihood of default given 
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the risks associated with their projects in this uncertain environment. Finally, the lack of 
mortgage collateral and the absence of low cost legal sanctions to enforce contracts has 
exposed the bank to serious risks of delinquent loan behavior. Not surprisingly, the 
institution has suffered an unacceptably high level of arrears. 
There is no immediate privatization solution to the development bank problem in 
Mozambique as there was in The Gambia. Nor, as we shall argue shortly, is there an NGO 
intermediation option as there is in The Gambia. One has to work through a damage 
control program within the bank itself. Promising steps to follow in the Mozambique bank 
have much in common with those laid out by Caprio, Atiyas and Hanson for financial 
institutions in transitional economies, namely, address the deficiency in information and 
human capital, and design internal incentive systems to deal with the agency problem 
(Caprio, Antiyas and Hanson). 
C. Lessons Learned for Banks in African Transitional Economies 
• Evidence from Mozambique suggests that banks in transitional economies in Africa 
need to establish a more effective information management system than has been 
characteristic of their past practices. Essential here is the creation of a risk 
management team supported with ample resources and responsibility to document 
performance of the portfolio on a regular and systematic basis. This should entail 
a -Ioan tracking' methodology on the loan repayment status of all outstanding loans 
Moreover, loan repayment status should be correlated with borrower characteristics 
(sector of activity, size of business, first time borrower, etc.) and loan characteristics 
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(term, loan size, collateral, interest rate, etc.) to generate a risk profile for current 
and future creditworthiness criteria used in loan evaluation exercises. 
• These banks should hire in new personnel that are computer literate and have some 
economics training and/or meaningful business background This new human capital 
should form the basis of the risk management team outlined above with this new 
human capital in place. The bank should computerize all its activities to better 
implement more effective management control, rapid check clearing facilities, 
portfolio and asset management, and risk management strategies. 
• In addition to the risk management team discussed above, transitional economy 
banks in Africa should set up an allied market intelligence unit to document key 
prices of outputs (products and services) and inputs for all the major markets repre-
sented by clients in the bank's portfolio. This should entail periodic field visits to 
selected business sites and markets by team members to actually collect and up-date 
this data at the ground level instead of relying too much on unreliable government 
generated data. 
• Allied to this market intelligence effort should be an effort to determine the cost 
effectiveness of alternative forms of collateral to establish the most appropriate 
guarantee for contract enforcement with different types of clientele. For example, 
instead of traditional mortgage property collateral that might be difficult to enforce, 
banks might identify secure accounts receivable for a client (i.e., ensured sales con-
tracts with established buyers) that could act as an acceptable collateral substitute. 
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• To reduce the risks of non-performing loans, transitional banks should limit direct 
lending to non-corporate, private agricultural producers except for established clien-
tele with good repayment records. Instead, the bank should focus on lending to 
larger wholesalers of agricultural inputs, on the one hand, and agricultural product 
buyers on the other hand. These traders are currently underfi.nanced and are able 
to offer more reliable guarantees and meet loan repayment schedules better than 
small sized agricultural producers. Traders are better positioned to sort and screen 
these clients (for their input contracts or forward contract purchases of farm pro-
ducts). In short, they suffer from much less imperfect information and transaction 
costs than do banks. 
• Finally, these banks should decentralize management authority sufficiently to make 
key branch managers and the principal loan officers under their jurisdiction more 
accountable for the performance of the loan portfolio generated and administered 
under their auspices. Among other things, these officers should have immediate and 
continuing access to the information generated by the risk management teams (on 
the current portfolio) and the market intelligence units (for the economy). This 
information should be incorporated into their loan evaluation exercises. Loan 
management criteria should be established that rewards good portfolio performance 
with bonuses and restricts pay raises and promotions for those responsible for a 
poorly performing portfolio (vis-a-vis the bank-wide average). These steps of 
decentralized profit centers and performance base salaries should mitigate the agency 
problem at the middle management level. 
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IV. Informal and Semi Formal Finance in Rudimentary Markets: The Options for 
Client-owned Intermediaries in Mozambique and The Gambia. 
A Introduction 
As seen in the above section, financial liberalization encouraged a restructuring of 
the formal banking industry to provide financial services in a more market oriented fashion 
in The Gambia and Mozambique. Empirical evidence from both countries, however, show 
that, pari-passu, this created a substantial decline in the supply of financial services 
(conventionally defined) from the formal banking sector. Both the development bank in 
Mozambique and commercial banks in The Gambia find it costly and risky to provide 
financial services to small scale businesses and farmers. Nonetheless, liberalization and 
privatization has led to increased private sector trading activity and the growth of many 
small scale businesses thereby creating an increased demand for financial services in both 
countries. A need has developed to fill the vacuum created by the retreat of the formal 
banking sector from farming and small scale finance. Semi-formal and informal financial 
mechanisms have traditionally been active suppliers of financial services to these more risky 
low income constituencies. Several different forms of semi-formal client owned institutions 
have emerged, especially in The Gambia, and informal financial markets are present in both 
countries. This section describes the functioning of informal and semi-formal financial 
markets and their relative success in filling the void created by the restructuring of the 
formal banking sector in The Gambia and Mozambique. 
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B. Informal financial markets: 
1. Market Vendor survey : 
Informal financial services are widespread in Africa, particularly among friends, 
neighbors and self-help groups. Also, trader credit through supplier and client marketing 
networks can play a valuable role in extending the frontier of finance from a rural clientele. 
The evidence on informal financial contracts in the marketing networks in our two countries, 
however, raise some questions concerning the degree and range of services supplied through 
these channels. Several recent studies by OSU highlight some of these issues. 
A total of 66 fruit and vegetable retail traders in 5 markets around Banjul and 73 
retail traders from 6 markets around Maputo were sampled in these recent OSU related 
studies. These surveys were carried out in late 1991 in Maputo and in early 1993 in Banjul. 
Table 9 summarizes the operational characteristics of these retail traders in these two peri-
urban areas. The majority of the traders were women and did not produce the commodities 
in which they traded. A substantial majority of the transactions with suppliers were effected 
through spot market transactions (immediate cash payment). Short term supplier credit was 
only available to a limited extent. Some modest levels of supplier credit and informal loans 
from friends and relatives were used in financing these trading activities, however, the major 
portion was through self-finance. Finance for these largely women traders was largely 
generated through participation in rotating savings and credit associations rather than 
through savings accounts in banks. In addition, kafo groups and moneykeepers also supplied 
savings mobilization services for the market traders in Banjul. Furthermore, cash rather 
than cheques were the principal form of payment to consummate market transactions in 
both countries. This limitation of the check clearing payment system, together with the lack 
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of deposits and loans from banks indicate the limits of the formal financial system in 
servicing retail traders. Regarding the downstream client end of the business in Banjul, the 
majority of the buyers were non-regular in nature. Regular buyers like smaller traders, hotel 
suppliers and restaurants constituted only 20% of the traders' portfolio. While regular client 
buyers were able to some extent to obtain products on short term credit, the majority of 
transactions involved immediate payment in cash. 
Table 9. Operadooal Claaracterlstka ol IDformal llnanclal Market TrallsactiODS amoog Market 
Veadors and Mk:roeatrepreauers Ia Peri·Urbu Areal or Maputo and BanJuL 
Traders Microbusincsses 
Operatioual Characteristics Banjul Maputo Banjur Maputo 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1. No. of sample 66 73 153 21 
2. Gender(% of total sample) 
a. Female 70 95 29 15 
b. Male 30 5 71 85 
3. Type of trausactions with suppliers (% of CODtracts in the sample) 
a. Credit, consignment & advance payment 
b. Immediate payment 19 45 32 7 
c. Average length of aedit and consignment transaction (days) 81 55 68 93 
4 2-4 20 NA 
4. Type of trausactions with regular buyers(% of contracts in the sample) 
a. Advance payment' 
b. Credit" 56 NA 62 0 
c. Immediate payment 56 s 
d. Average length of aedit transaction (days) 44 NA 38 95 
2 NA 4 7 
5. Participation in informal groups(% of sample) 
a. Rotating savings and aedit 42 55 24 1' 
b. Moneykeepers 26 0 12 0 
6. Instruments used in transactions(% of contracts) 
a. Cheques to suppliers 0 0 NA~ 20 
b. Cheques from buyers 0 0 NA 2 
c. Cash to suppliers 100 100 NA 80 
d. Cash from buyers 100 100 NA 98 
SOurce: OSO survey 1993, Uttie et at, 1992; GraJWD et at, 1993 (a), Baydas et aLt 1993. 
a Represents percentage of all entrepreneurs. 
b Represents advance payment from buyers to samples traders and entrepreneurs. 
c Represents credit from sample traders and entrepreneurs to buyers. 
d Number of savings accounts. 
e Although form of payment was not explicitly explored in The Gambia study, field impression indicate 
an overwhelming use of cash for spot market transactions. Only a handful of larger bakeries and metal 
working establishments used c:hecks. 
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2. Microenterprise survey: 
The microenterprises in Maputo covered 21 microbusinesses selected in early 1992 
for a case study from the clientele of the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD). The 
study in The Gambia covered 153 microbusiness operators in early 1992. Table 9 
summarizes the operational characteristics of the microentrepreneurs sampled for the study. 
In general, supplier credit was non-existent in Maputo compared to Banjul since many 
suppliers were foreign who demanded payment up front before shipping goods into the 
uncertain and insecure environment in Mozambique. Similarly, loans to clients were almost 
non-existent in Mozambique compared to The Gambia In general, transactions involving 
credit, consignment and advance payment require either a long-term established relationship 
among the contracting parties or a stable market to reduce delinquency. The lack of credit 
transactions in Mozambique compared to The Gambia indicates that Mozambican markets 
are far more unstable and risky than the markets in The Gambia which suggests the country 
is still in the "early" stage of the transition process. One must remember that Mozambique 
at this time was still experiencing great risk in commercial transactions due to its civil war 
and, at the same time, the lack of appropriate legal and institutional reforms have held back 
the expansion of contracting among third parties. As a result, Mozambican businesses are 
largely self-financed. Furthermore, participation by microentrepreneurs in ROSCAS and 
non-rotating savings and credit associations were limited compared to retail traders (see line 
5 (a) and (b) in Table 8). This is not surprising since ROSCAs are logically drawn upon to 
facilitate short term working capital needs for traders working in close proximity and daily 
contact. They are a less useful vehicle for widely dispersed independent producers. 
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As is the case of market vendors, cash is the principal means of payment in both 
countries. Some use of checks is seen in the Maputo survey. This no doubt is influenced 
by the fact that the sample in Maputo was drawn from clients who already had loans from 
the BPD, the country's development bank. The sample from Banjul was drawn from a 
random geographic sample. In 1991, only 2.5 percent of the Banjul sample were able to 
obtain a loan from a formal financial institution (Graham et al., 1993). 
The above findings raise several questions: why is credit not a major part of this 
retail world and why are interlinked operations, so common in Asian countries, relatively 
absent here? Also, why is there a lack of a regular and established clientele? Finally, how 
are contract enforcement problems managed in these informal financial markets? Informal 
financial markets are better equipped than formal banks to mitigate moral hazard and 
enforcement problems implicit in credit transactions. Their capability to offer loans to non-
bankable clients is a manifestation of their ability to gather and utilize local 'information' 
about their agents. Information is, however, costly and requires geographical proximity and 
long-term relationships. Indeed, the availability of local inexpensive information, 
enforcement mechanisms, and a good policy environment are preconditions for active 
informal financial markets. Yet, the limited role of informal financial markets at this level 
of trading activities in both countries suggest that they are not yet successful in dealing with 
these problems. This is, perhaps, due to the fact that there are few transactions that involve 
regular contracting parties. Furthermore, in Maputo, markets are still emerging, following 
its socialist past, in which private markets and conventional commercial contracts were 
severely circumscribed. In Banjul, this may be due more to frequently changing clientele. 
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High mobility among agents in a risky environment increases information and enforcement 
costs thereby impeding an active informal financial market. 
The limited role of informal finance in servicing these marginal private sector 
constituencies leads to certain implications to the formal banking sector. In general, 
informal financial markets are dynamic and respond to the developments in the formal 
banking sector. If agency problems impede the informal financial markets to provide viable 
and efficient services to the retail market vendors, formal financial markets stands little 
chance in supplying financial services to this sector. 
Transactions at the level of retail market vendors essentially involve quick turnover 
and frequent contact among the transacting parties. This would be facilitated by an easily 
accessible and cost efficient financial market to smooth out transactions. However, formal 
financial markets in these two countries are seldom accessible to these retail traders to 
facilitate their operations. Inflexible deposit requirements such as current account deposits 
with high minimum deposit requirements in The Gambia and lack of access to other liquid 
asset facilities in both countries create barriers for these traders. Furthermore, high loan 
rates and tangible collateral requirements increase transaction costs and create barriers for 
accessing bank loans for these traders in The Gambia. It is, perhaps, too difficult to achieve 
financial deepening down to this level of retail trading with the current rudimentary stage 
of the banking industry in many African countries. Whereas informal markets can service 
the short term working capital needs of retail traders, there is still a demand for term loans 
to finance capital investments and an equally important demand for remunerative and 
flexible deposit services. The present status of formal banking in countries like Mozambique 
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and The Gambia offers little hope as a source of financial services for small scale 
businesses. The rapid emergence of semi-formal financial agents are perhaps an indication 
of an unmet demand for financial services by both formal and informal financial agents. 
These semi-formal institutions are increasingly being discussed as possible viable alternatives 
to service the growing demand for financial services by small fanners, small traders and 
microentrepreneurs. 
C. The Semi-formal financial market 
Semi-formal financial markets are organized but outside the purview of Central Bank 
regulations. Credit unions, Cooperatives and NGOs usually constitute the set of semi-formal 
institutions in developing countries. In general, cooperatives are unviable and inefficient in 
both countries under study here while credit unions are underdeveloped in The Gambia and 
absent in Mozambique. NGOs have been active in promoting income generation activities 
for some time in The Gambia. It was expected that this past operational experience at the 
village level would generate a comparative advantage for NGOs to also supply cost efficient 
financial services through reduced information costs. Furthermore, it was expected that the 
implementation of credit and savings programs with other developmental activities would 
reinforce the income generating activities in NGO service areas. Several international 
donors, therefore, became eager to support NGO initiatives as an alternative institution to 
provide financial services to marginal clientele. 
NGO activities can be classified into five different categories. The level of NGO 
participation in these categories depends upon the political and economic environments of 
the host country. The five categories are: 
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(i) Refugee survival services; 
(ii) Development grant initiatives (to provide social and community wide facilities 
and infrastructure); 
(ill) Development lending activities for income generating objectives. Services are 
directed to individual clientele through grants and loans. Expectations of loan 
repayment is usually not very high; 
(iv) Brokering services between a marginal clientele and a bank to facilitate access 
to loans. These reduce transactions costs for low income clientele and lending 
institutions; 
(v) Financial intermediary role to provide financial services explicitly or as part 
of other services to the community. 
Based on the above categories, the level of NGO participation in The Gambia and 
Mozambique can be ranked as follows: 
Table 10 NGO Activity In 'lhe Gambia and Mozambique by Categoey of Service. 
Categories The Gambia Mozambique 
Refugee services 0 3 
Development grants 3 1 
DeYelopment lending 3 0 
Brokeriug services 1 0 
Financial intermediary services 2 0 
RankS: 0 = No partiapation; 1 = MOdeSt actiVity; 2 = ActiVe partiapation; 3 == Very active partiapation. 
Table 10 indicates that NGOs are more active in providing refugee services rather 
than financial services in Mozambique compared to The Gambia. This clearly grows out 
of the pressing need to deal with the human tragedy derived from the civil war that has tom 
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the country apart for the past ten years. Also, other NGO services grow most rapidly in a 
liberalized economy and in a democratic policy environment. The relatively more h"beral 
and open society in The Gambia has stimulated a response from several NGOs to create 
an alternative supply of financial services for their marginal constituencies. Their diverse 
operational philosophies, however, have resulted in heterogenous financial technologies that 
send mixed market signals and create market segmentation. Indeed, the entry of NGOs in 
the rural financial markets of The Gambia to overcome the lack of government services and 
the limited reach of formal financial services has led to a number of cases of market failure 
(Graham et al., 1993). This raises the question whether NGOs can develop into viable 
semi-formal financial institutions. An examination of the NGO experiences in The Gambia 
can shed some light on the role of NGOs as financial intermediaries and help us derive 
policy implications for the financial sector in newly liberalized economies in Africa. 
Principal-agent problems are allegedly low for NGOs compared to formal lenders 
such as banks due to informational advantages gained from their operations at the grass 
roots level. However, problems inherent to rural financial markets remain in terms of 
developing incentive compatible contracts, contract enforcement and effective monitoring 
of agents. Lack of regulatory guidelines for NGOs in The Gambia combined with lack of 
legal support to enforce contracts offer weak incentives for the development of sustainable 
financial programs by NGOs. The majority of these programs are frequently designed as 
an opportunistic response to donor signals with little emphasis on program viability and 
sustainability. The problems can, however, be minimiud through appropriate organizational 
design. We review the operational characteristics of four different NGO programs that 
32 
currently provide financial services in rural Gambia. The evidence on their performance 
offers insights into the organizational features conducive to a sustainable supply of financial 
services. 
NGOs became active participants in Gambian financial markets in the 1980s as a 
result of economic liberalization and the concomitant decline in formal financial services. 
Currently, 14 national and international NGOs provide financial services supplying nearly 
20% of total agricultural loans (Graham et al., 1993). The operational strategies of these 
several NGOs range from the classic supply leading model to more unsubsidized institutions. 
Table 11 summarizes the operational strategies and performance indicators of four 
representative NGO designs observed in The Gambia. Indeed, the designs can be arranged 
in a continuum based on their level of subsidization. 
At one extreme in column one of Table 11, Action Aid, The Gambia (AATG) 
represents a typical supply leading model that is supported by external funds and offers 
subsidized loans to a targeted clientele. At the other extreme in column four, the Village 
Savings and Credit Association (VISACA) offers untargeted loans at market rates using 
locally mobilized resources and attractive deposit services. The middle section of the 
continuum is composed of Gambia Womens Financing Association (GWF A) that offers only 
unsubsidized loans using external funds and no deposit services, and the Association of 
Farmers, Educators and Teachers (AFBT) that mobilizes local savings to a large extent to 
provide unsubsidized loans that are linked to savings held by the beneficiaries. 
In general, the evidence in Table 11 suggests that the sustainability of a program 
largely depends on its ability to: (i) generate internal funds through deposit mobilization by 
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offering attractive interest rates to fund loans; (ii) cover operational costs without external 
subsidization; (iii) mitigate risks due to covariance in incomes through geographic and 
portfolio diversification; (iv) reduce agency problems through an increased stake of the 
depositor-savers and the local loan approval committee; (v) develop appropriate collateral 
substitutes in the absence of tangible collateral held by the population; and (iv) recover 
loans. If performance indicators such as loan recovery rate, marginal clients served and 
services offered are a reflection of the efficiency of a program followed by an NGO, the 
VISACA stands out in Table 11 as the best model to attain sustainability. 
Table 11 OperatiODBI Characteristics of Selected NGO Designs ill Pro-riding FinaDclal Sen'k'a and 
their Performance Indicators: 1be Case of 1be Gambia. 
Items 
t. Status 
2.Sponsors 
3. 0r:KHniptional ciesjp features 
a. Operational philosophy 
b. Source of funds for financial 
services 
c. Fmancial services offered 
d. Geographic coverage 
e. Target clientele 
t Mode of reachiug clientele 
g. Target enterprise 
(1) 
Inti. 
UK' 
(2) 
Natl. 
NGOs 
(3) (4) 
Nad Hybrid 
WID ofWB6 DANIDA7, US CIDR/KFW' 
embassy 
Encourage income Inaease access Improve access Provide 
generating - production to financial unsubsidized 
activities and local loans - women services financial 
organizations through village services 
banks 
External External Mostly local All local 
savings; some savings 
external 
Credit, Credit Credit and Credit and 
Compulsory Savings Savings 
savings 
Rural Urban Rural Rural 
Women and Women M.ic:robus.wom. Untaraeted 
Farmers en and youth 
Mostlybfo Individuals Mostlybfo Mostly 
groups some and groups individuals and 
Individuals somebfo 
groups 
Agrl Petty trading Veg. gardens Untaraeted 
and Microbus. 
(cont.) 
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Table 3. (continued) Operational Characteristics of Selected NGO Designs in Providing Financial 
Services and their Performance Indicators: The Case of The Gambia. 
Items NGOs 
4. 1'erms ond conditions and 
jnstruments psed 
L Principal Type of loans 
b. Type of saving accounts 
c. Loan int.rate (%/yr) 
d Savings int.rate (%/yr) 
e. Collateral 
5. Subsidy component 
a. External teclmical assistance 
b. Operational costs 
6. Performance Indicators (as of 1991) 
a. No. of loans issued 
b. No. of savings deposits 
c. Ave. short term loan size($) 
d. Repayment rate(%) 
e. Percent of women clients 
7. Aan£Y Problem 
Short term, In-
kind loans 
Compulsory fixed 
deposit held in 
c:entral office 
12 
0 
Group liability 
High 
High 
Short term, 
cash loans 
None 
24-25 
Third party 
Moderate 
High 
246 indiv; 53 kafo 66 indiv. 
groups 
NA 0 
25 580 
42 
63 
Severe 
92. 
100 
Unclear-
probably 
serious 
1 AATG: Action Aid, The Gambia; 
2 GWFA: Gambia Women's F'mancing Association; 
3 AFET : Association of Farmers, Educators and Trainers 
4 VISACA : Vlllage Savings and Credit Associations 
5 UK : United Kingdom 
6 WID of WB : Women in Development division of the World Bank 
7 DANIDA : Danish International Development Aid 
8 ODRJICFW: 
Source: Graham ct.al, 1993. 
Short term, 
cash loans 
Fued deposits 
held in central 
office 
24 
15-18 
Guarantors 
and 3/4 
savings 
High 
Moderate 
1343 indiv. 
NA 
28 
72 
82 
Moderate 
Short term, 
cash loans 
Current and 
fixed deposits 
heldinJocal 
units 
40-60 
20-40 
Animals, farm 
implements 
and jewelry 
Moderate 
None 
1266 indiv. 
485 indiv. 
37 
95 
52 
Low 
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In summary, the emphasis on locally mobilized resources to supply loans and the use 
of local personnel to screen applicants have helped the VISACAs to reduce monitoring and 
enforcement costs. Furthermore, their attractive savings programs that are flextble, 
remunerative and accessible with minimal transaction costs provide incentives for savings 
mobilization and induce an incentive compatible environment for contract enforcement on 
borrowers. In addition, their use of both tangible collateral and effective collateral 
substitutes to supply loans to asset-poor members and enforce contracts contribute towards 
their success in loan repayment. The VISACA model is clearly a pareto improvement over 
the other NGO models in The Gambia. However, it is still susceptible to systemic failure 
due to its design as a village unit rather than as a broad network that could mitigate 
covariant income through geographic diversification. Furthermore, there is limitations to 
locally available resources that can be mobilized in VISACAs. Hence, VISACAs' loan 
portfolio is constrained by the economic activities of the region in which they operate. 
However, the model underscores the positive impact of local savings on the portfolio 
performance of the village banks. 
V. Summary and Conclusions 
The conclusions drawn from this study are several. First, it is clear that stabilization 
and deregulation was a necessary condition for both economies to eventually work 
themselves out of growing economic stagnation from the late 1980s onwards. Second, it is 
also clear that deregulation of markets and a need to clean up the balance sheets of 
insolvent development banks led to a decline in the real levels of outstanding credit from 
36 
the levels established during the period of supply leading finance in the early to mid 1980s. 
This, however, was to be expected given the high level of non-performing loans inflating the 
credit data for the earlier era. Third, it is clear that there is a sectoral incidence in the 
reallocation of the portfolio of formal financial markets as agricultural lending declines 
relative to non-agricultural lending. Again, this is not surprising given the fact that the 
major unsustainable component of the earlier supply leading era lay in its parastatal 
servicing of a rural clientele. Fourth, the initial starting conditions shape the paths and final 
impact of financial deregulation. When the country has incorporated its supply lending 
financial development strategy within an already existing private banking sector (as in The 
Gambia), the options for the privatization of the bank or of most or all of the future 
financial services is feasible. However, when the previous supply of financial services 
occurred within a centrally planned socialist regime, (with no effective formal private 
sector), the path of deregulation will more closely parallel the experience of a transitional 
regime moving from a communist to a market society in which there is still a role for public 
sector banks. The challenge here is to secure more viable public sector financial institutions 
while the more market oriented government reduces inflation, deregulates financial prices, 
reduces subsidization, and establishes property rights and effective contract enforcement 
mechanisms. In the short to medium term, one is privatizing the economy (i.e., the new 
clientele of the bank) rather than the bank itself. 
In the meantime, riskier but potentially remunerative low income clientele, 
particularly rural clientele, are screened out of formal financial sector portfolios, as seen in 
both of the countries under review here. In short, the formal sector banking institutions 
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have the resources, but not the information or the contract enforcement mechanisms to 
service this clientele, while informal market operators in general lack the resources but have 
the local information and better contract enforcement vehicles for these clients. 
Nevertheless, field research in both countries underscored the limited degree of informal 
financial contracting through supplier and client marketing channels. At least for these two 
countries the strategic link that appears underfinanced in these networks are the larger 
wholesaler, importer agents who are struggling to replace the former parastatal enterprises 
in the privatization of input marketing channels in the liberalization programs. 
Finally, it would appear that semi-formal financial institutions can play a positive role 
in servicing the demand for financial services from this low income rural clientele. In The 
Gambia, several NGO initiatives are underway to fill the vacuum left by the downscaling 
of government subsidized credit delivery vehicles in rural areas. Local NGOs presumably 
have a comparative advantage over formal banks in the quality of local borrower 
information. However, they do not necessarily have the means to deal with effective 
monitoring and contract enforcement at this level. The evidence to date strongly suggests 
that local deposit-savings mobilization is essential to ensure a proper organizational 
incentive for effective monitoring and contract enforcement. Therefore, NGOs that 
emphasize this frequently forgotten half of rural finance as the principal source of funds for 
on-lending will have a greater likelihood of success in building viable local intermediaries. 
Deposit services in village banks or savings and credit associations generate valuable services 
of safekeeping, liquidity reserves and returns on savings. liquidity reserves are particularly 
important for rural clientele to manage risk and smooth consumption. Subsidization is 
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legitimate in these cases for initial start up costs and technical assistance support over a 
period of time. However, unsubsidized market rates should prevail for deposits and loans, 
otherwise subsidized loan rates will come at the expense of a lower return for net savers in 
these institutions, weakening the base for local deposit mobilization. 
Two important research agendas grow out of this review. First, it is necessary to 
document more fully the numerous NGO (semi-formal) experiments currently operating in 
Africa. Some are designed with both a savings and credit dimension for individual client 
services (like the VISACAs); others are also designed with a savings and credit dimension 
but for groups rather than individual clients (i.e., the Grameen Bank model) while yet others 
are designed only through the credit dimension by drawing upon a merchant-moneylender 
partner on a commission basis to issue and collect on loans. Country or region specific 
conditions may favor one organizational form over another. What isn't clear is how 
successful each bas been in incorporating local information for lending decisions, the terms 
and conditions of their financial services, and the monitoring and contract enforcement 
mechanisms adopted to ensure institutional viability. This field research on semi-formal 
financial intermediaries could complement the important work that Udry and Eswaran and 
Kotwal have done on state contingent contracts on credit as insurance in agrarian 
economies. The profession has been enriched by recent scholarship on the multiple roles 
and functions of informal contracts and the way in which they substitute for missing markets. 
The literature, however, is more sparse on the recent experience of semi-formal financial 
intermediaries and the degree to which they can resolve the information and contract 
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enforcement problems necessary to expand the frontier of finance in rural African and open 
the possibility for linking formal and informal financial markets in Africa. 
The other major research agenda concerns the most feasible organizational reforms 
for public sector development banks. It would be unrealistic to think that a number of 
African countries would be able to have any formal financial institutional pressure without 
continuing to draw upon these institutions in the medium term to supply formal financial 
setvices. This is particularly pertinent for former socialist regimes in Africa gradually 
working themselves towards a market economy. The task is to redesign these institutions 
to achieve greater institutional viability. First, domestic savings mobilization can expand the 
range of financial services beyond that of credit alone and, at the same time, create a local 
constituency concerned with the solvency of the institution. Decentralized management is 
an additional reform that allows locally recruited managers to trade on their stock of local 
knowledge to reduce information asymmetries in the selection of borrowers. Delegating 
responsibility and accountability to local branch managers can work if these branches can 
be developed as profit centers and managers are rewarded with performance based salaries. 
These features can create incentives for local managers to sort and screen clientele careful 
and engage in more diligent monitoring effort. 
Reforms of this nature apparently succeeded in Indonesia. For Indonesian 
development banks, however, the more densely populated Indonesian society reduce 
transaction costs and the risks of covariant incomes for these banks due to more diversified 
village and regional constituencies. African banks servicing a rural clientele will not be able 
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to enjoy the same cost economies and risk diversification due to operating in more sparsely 
settled and less economically diversified rural areas. 
In summary, country specific research on the current state of development bank 
restructuring could offer insights into the role of initial conditions and subsequent 
organir.ation strategies hindering or facilitating feasible reforms viability. These findings 
could identify information and human capital deficiencies and weaknesses in the rules of 
governance and institutional autonomy, areas in which donor assistance and resources could 
make a contnbution in pushing the reform process along more promising paths in 
collaboration with host governments. 
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